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1Abstract
This paper builds a framework for the analysis of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations that incorpo-
rates the endogenous determination of the number of producers and products over the business
cycle. Economic expansions induce higher entry rates by prospective entrants subject to sunk
investment costs. The sluggish response of the number of producers generates a new and po-
tentially important endogenous propagation mechanism for business cycle models. The return
to investment determines household saving decisions, producer entry, and the allocation of la-
bor across sectors. Our framework replicates several features of business cycles and predicts
procyclical pro￿ts even for preference speci￿cations that imply countercyclical markups.
21 Introduction
This paper studies the role of endogenous producer entry and creation of new products in propa-
gating business cycle ￿ uctuations. Towards that goal, we develop a dynamic, stochastic, general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopolistic competition, consumer love for variety, and sunk
entry costs. We seek to understand the contributions of the intensive and extensive margins ￿
changes in production of existing goods and in the range of available goods ￿to the response of
the economy to changes in aggregate productivity.
Empirically, new products are not only introduced by new ￿rms, but also by existing ￿rms (most
often at their existing production facilities). We therefore take a broad view of producer entry (and
exit) as also incorporating product creation (and destruction) by existing ￿rms, although our model
does not address the determinants of product variety within ￿rms. Even though new ￿rms account
for a small share of overall production (for U.S. manufacturing, new ￿rms account for 2-3% of both
overall production and employment), the contribution of new products (including those produced
at existing ￿rms) is substantially larger ￿important enough to be a major source of aggregate
output changes. Furthermore, as is the case with ￿rm entry, new product creation is also very
strongly procyclical.1
The important contribution of product creation and destruction to aggregate output is convinc-
ingly documented in a recent paper by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010), who are the ￿rst to
measure product creation and destruction within ￿rms across a large portion of the U.S. economy
(all U.S. manufacturing ￿rms). For each ￿rm, they record production levels (dollar values) across
5-digit U.S. SIC categories, which still represent a very coarse de￿nition of products.2 Bernard,
Redding, and Schott ￿rst document that 94% of product additions by U.S. manufacturing ￿rms
occur within their pre-existing production facilities (as opposed to new plants or via mergers and
acquisitions). They further show that 68% of ￿rms change their product mix within a 5-year census
period (representing 93% of ￿rms weighted by output). Of these ￿rms, 66% both add and drop
1The working paper version of this study (Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2007) contains evidence on the procyclicality
of net ￿rm entry (measured as new incorporations minus failures) and pro￿ts for the period 1947-1998. Our conclusions
there are in line with the pioneering work of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988). Here, we focus on product
creation, rather than ￿rm entry.
2As an example, the 5-digit SIC codes within the 4-digit SIC category 3949￿ Sporting and Athletics Goods￿are:
39491￿ Fishing tackle and equipment, 39492￿ Golf equipment, 39493￿ Playground equipment, 39494￿ Gymnasium and
exercise equipment, and 39495￿ Other sporting and athletic goods. For all of U.S. manufacturing, there are 1848
5-digit products.
3products (representing 87% of ￿rms weighted by output). Thus, product creation over time is not
just a secular trend at the ￿rm level (whereby ￿rms steadily increase the range of products they
produce over time). Most importantly, Bernard, Redding, and Schott show that product creation
and destruction account for important shares of overall production: Over a 5-year period ￿a hori-
zon usually associated with the length of business cycles ￿ , the value of new products (produced
at existing ￿rms) is 33.6% of overall output during that period (-30.4% of output for the lost value
from product destruction at existing ￿rms). These numbers are almost twice (1.8 times) as large
as those accounted for by changes at the intensive margin ￿production increases and decreases
for the same product at existing ￿rms. The overall contribution of the extensive margin (product
creation and destruction) would be even higher if a ￿ner level of product disaggregation (beyond
the 5-digit level) were available.3
Put together, product creation (both by existing ￿rms and new ￿rms) accounts for 46.6% of
output in a 5-year period, while the lost value from product destruction (by existing and exiting
￿rms) accounts for 44% of output. This represents a minimal annual contribution of 9.3% (for
product creation) and 8.8% (for product destruction). The actual annual contributions are likely
larger, not only because the coarse de￿nition of a product potentially misses much product creation
and destruction within the 5-digit SIC category, but also because additions to and subtractions from
output across years within the same 5-year interval (for a given ￿rm-product combination) are not
recorded. Relatedly, Den Haan and Sedlacek (2010) estimate the contribution of the extensive
margin (measured along the employment dimension) to total value added. They calculate the
contribution of ￿ cyclical workers￿(workers who during the period under scrutiny experienced a non-
employment spell) over a 3-year interval for Germany and the U.S. and ￿nd that this amounts to
roughly half of total value added.
The substantial contribution of product creation and destruction is also con￿rmed by Broda and
Weinstein (2010), who measure products at the ￿nest possible level of disaggregation: the product
barcode. Their data cover all of the purchases of products with barcodes by a representative sample
of U.S. consumers. An important feature of the evidence in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010)
3Returning to the example of 5-digit SIC 39494 (Gymnasium and exercise equipment) from the previous footnote:
Any production of a new equipment product, whether a treadmill, an elliptical machine, a stationary bike, or any
weight machine, would be recorded as production of the same product and hence be counted toward the intensive
margin of production.
4is con￿rmed by Broda and Weinstein￿ s highly disaggregated data: 92% of product creation occurs
within existing ￿rms. Broda and Weinstein ￿nd that 9% of the consumers￿purchases in a year are
devoted to new goods not previously available.4 Similarly to Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010),
Broda and Weinstein ￿nd that the market share of new products is four times larger than the
market share of new ￿rms (measured either in terms of output or employment), precisely because
most product creation occurs within the ￿rm (the same conclusion arises for product destruction
versus ￿rm exit). Furthermore, Broda and Weinstein report that this product creation is strongly
procyclical at quarterly business cycle frequency. The evidence on the strong procyclicality of
product creation is also con￿rmed by Axarloglou (2003) for U.S. manufacturing at a monthly
frequency.
In our model, we assume symmetric, homothetic preferences over a continuum of goods. This
nests several tractable speci￿cations (including C.E.S.) as special cases. To keep the setup simple,
we do not model multi-product ￿rms. In our model presentation below, and in the discussion
of results, there is a one-to-one identi￿cation between a producer, a product, and a ￿rm. This
is consistent with much of the macroeconomic literature with monopolistic competition, which
similarly uses ￿￿rm￿to refer to the producer of an individual good. However, the relevant pro￿t-
maximizing unit in our setup is best interpreted as a production line, which could be nested
within a multi-product ￿rm. The boundary of the ￿rm across products is then not determined.
Strategic interactions (within and across ￿rms) do not arise due to our assumption of a continuum
of goods, so long as each multi-product ￿rm produces a countable set of goods of measure zero.5 In
this interpretation of our model, producer entry and exit capture the product-switching dynamics
within ￿rms documented by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010).
In our baseline setup, each individual producer/￿rm produces output using only labor. However,
the number of ￿rms that produce in each period can be interpreted as the capital stock of the
economy, and the decision of households to ￿nance entry of new ￿rms is akin to the decision to
4This 9% ￿gure is low relative to its 9.3% counterpart from Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010), given the
substantial di⁄erence in product disaggregation across the two studies (the extent of product creation increases
monotonically with the level of product disaggregation). We surmise that this is due to the product sampling of
Broda and Weinstein￿ s (2010) data: only including ￿nal goods with barcodes. Food items, which have the lowest
levels of product creation rates, tend to be over-represented in those samples.
5This di⁄erentiates our approach from Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), who assume a discrete set of producers
within each sector. In that case, the boundaries of ￿rms crucially determine the strategic interaction between
individual competitors.
5accumulate physical capital in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model. Product creation
(or, more broadly, entry) takes place subject to sunk product development costs, which are paid
by investors in the expectation of future pro￿ts. Free entry equates the value of a product (the
present discounted value of pro￿ts) to the sunk cost; subsequent to entry, the per-period pro￿ts
￿ uctuate endogenously. This distinguishes our framework from earlier studies that modeled entry
in a frictionless way: there, entry drives pro￿ts to zero in every period. (We discuss the relation
between our work and these studies later on.) Our framework is hence closer to that of variety-based
endogenous growth models (see e.g. Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, and Aghion and
Howitt, 1991). Indeed, just as the RBC model is a discrete-time, stochastic, general equilibrium
version of the exogenous growth model that abstracts from growth to focus on business cycles, our
model can be viewed as a discrete-time, stochastic, general equilibrium version of variety-based,
endogenous growth models that abstracts from endogenous growth (We discuss in greater detail
further on why we have chosen to abstract from growth).
From a conceptual standpoint, linking innovation-based growth and business cycle theory is
not new: The history of this idea goes back at least to Schumpeter (1934). Aghion and Howitt
(1991) review some attempts at unifying growth and business cycles. Shleifer￿ s (1986) theory of
implementation cycles is one example of the conceptual link between (endogenous) business cycles
and innovation-based growth theory: cycles occur because ￿rms, expecting higher pro￿ts in booms
due to a demand externality, innovate simultaneously in the expectation of a boom; the boom
therefore becomes self-ful￿lling. However, to the best of our knowledge this is the ￿rst study
that blends elements of variety-based endogenous growth theory and RBC methodology (including
the focus on exogenous aggregate productivity as the only source of uncertainty). Moreover, our
framework also uses a general structure of preferences for variety that implies that markups fall
when market size increases (which can be viewed as a dynamic extension of Krugman￿ s, 1979
insights about the e⁄ects of market size on ￿rm size and markups).
The investment in new productive units is ￿nanced by households through the accumulation of
shares in the portfolio of ￿rms. The stock-market price of this investment ￿ uctuates endogenously
in response to shocks and is at the core of our propagation mechanism. Together with the shares￿
payo⁄(monopolistic pro￿ts), it determines the return to investment/entry, which in turn determines
household saving decisions, producer entry, and the allocation of labor across sectors in the economy.
6This contrasts with the standard, one-sector RBC models, where the price of physical capital is
constant absent capital adjustment costs, and the return to investment is simply equal to the
marginal product of physical capital. This approach to investment and the price of capital provides
an alternative to adjustment costs in order to obtain a time-varying price of capital. It also
introduces a direct link between investment and (the expectation of) economic pro￿ts. In our
model, labor is allocated to production of existing goods and creation of new ones; and the total
number of products acts as capital in the production of the consumption basket. This structure
is close to two-sector versions of the RBC model where labor is allocated to production of the
consumption good and to investment that augments the capital stock; and capital is also used to
produce the consumption good. We discuss this relationship in further detail below.
In terms of matching key second moments of the U.S. business cycle, our baseline model per-
forms at least as well as a traditional RBC model (it does better at matching the volatility of
output and hours). Importantly, our model can additionally account for stylized facts pertaining
to entry, pro￿ts, and markups. With translog preferences (for which the elasticity of substitution is
increasing in the number of goods produced), our model is further able to simultaneously generate
countercyclical markups and procyclical pro￿ts; it also reproduces the time pro￿le of the markup￿ s
correlation with the business cycle. These are well-known challenges for models of countercyclical
markups based on sticky prices (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, for a discussion). To the best
of our knowledge, our framework is the ￿rst to address and explain these issues simultaneously.6
Moreover, we develop an extension of our framework that also incorporates investment in physical
capital. This signi￿cantly improves the performance of the model (relative to both our baseline
without physical capital and the standard RBC model) in reproducing the volatilities of output,
hours worked, and total investment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. Section 3
computes impulse responses and second moments for a numerical example and illustrates the prop-
erties of the model for transmission of economic ￿ uctuations. Section 4 outlines the extension of
our model to include investment in physical capital and illustrates its second-moment properties.
6Perfect-competition models, such as the standard RBC, address none of these facts. Imperfect-competition
versions (with or without sticky prices) generate ￿ uctuations in pro￿ts (and, for sticky prices, in markups) but no
entry. Frictionless-entry models discussed later generate ￿ uctuations in entry (and, in some versions ￿such as Cook,
2001, Comin and Gertler, 2006, or Jaimovich and Floetotto, 2008 ￿ , also markups) but with zero pro￿ts.
7Section 5 discusses the relation between our work and other contributions to the literature on entry
and business cycles. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Household Preferences and the Intratemporal Consumption Choice
The economy is populated by a unit mass of atomistic, identical households. All contracts and
prices are written in nominal terms. Prices are ￿ exible. Thus, we only solve for the real variables
in the model. However, as the composition of the consumption basket changes over time due to
￿rm entry (a⁄ecting the de￿nition of the consumption-based price index), we introduce money as
a convenient unit of account for contracts. Money plays no other role in the economy. For this
reason, we do not model the demand for cash currency, and resort to a cashless economy as in
Woodford (2003).
The representative household supplies Lt hours of work each period t in a competitive labor mar-
ket for the nominal wage rate Wt and maximizes expected intertemporal utility Et
￿P1
s=t ￿s￿tU (Cs;Ls)
￿
,
where C is consumption and ￿ 2 (0;1) the subjective discount factor. The period utility function
takes the form U (Ct;Lt) = lnCt ￿ ￿(Lt)
1+1=’ =(1 + 1=’), ￿ > 0, where ’ ￿ 0 is the Frisch elas-
ticity of labor supply to wages, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply.
Our choice of functional form for the utility function is guided by results in King, Plosser, and
Rebelo (1988): Given separable preferences, log utility from consumption ensures that income and
substitution e⁄ects of real wage variation on e⁄ort cancel out in steady state; this is necessary to
have constant steady-state e⁄ort and balanced growth if there is productivity growth.
At time t, the household consumes the basket of goods Ct, de￿ned over a continuum of goods
￿. At any given time t, only a subset of goods ￿t ￿ ￿ is available. Let pt (!) denote the nominal
price of a good ! 2 ￿t. Our model can be solved for any parametrization of symmetric homothetic
preferences. For any such preferences, there exists a well de￿ned consumption index Ct and an
associated welfare-based price index Pt. The demand for an individual variety, ct (!), is then
obtained as ct(!)d! = Ct@Pt=@pt(!), where we use the conventional notation for quantities with a
continuum of goods as ￿ ow values (see the Appendix for more details).
We anticipate symmetric equilibrium across products. Given the demand level per variety, the
8symmetric price elasticity of demand ￿ is in general a function of the number Nt of goods (where Nt
is the mass of ￿t): ￿(Nt) ￿ (@ct(!)=@pt(!))(pt(!)=ct(!)), for any symmetric variety !. The bene￿t
of additional product variety is described by the relative price ￿t (!) = ￿(Nt) ￿ pt(!)=Pt, for any
symmetric variety !, or, in elasticity form: ￿(Nt) ￿ ￿0(Nt)Nt=￿(Nt). Together, ￿(Nt) and ￿(Nt)
completely characterize the e⁄ects of consumption preferences in our model; explicit expressions
for these objects can be obtained upon specifying functional forms for preferences, as will become
clear in the discussion below.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms, each producing a di⁄erent variety
! 2 ￿. Production requires only one factor, labor (this assumption is relaxed in Section 4, where
we introduce physical capital). Aggregate labor productivity is indexed by Zt, which represents the
e⁄ectiveness of one unit of labor. Zt is exogenous and follows an AR(1) process (in logarithms).
Output supplied by ￿rm ! is yt (!) = Ztlt (!), where lt (!) is the ￿rm￿ s labor demand for productive
purposes. The unit cost of production, in units of the consumption basket Ct, is wt=Zt, where
wt ￿ Wt=Pt is the real wage.
Prior to entry, ￿rms face an exogenous sunk entry cost of fE e⁄ective labor units (as in Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, Judd, 1985, and Romer, 1990, among others), equal to wtfE=Zt units of
the consumption basket. This speci￿cation ensures that exogenous productivity shocks are truly
aggregate in our model, as they a⁄ect symmetrically both production of existing goods and creation
of new products.7 Given our modeling assumption relating each ￿rm to a product line, we think
of the entry cost as the development and setup cost associated with a particular variety.
There are no ￿xed production costs. Hence, all ￿rms that enter the economy produce in every
period, until they are hit with a ￿death￿shock, which occurs with probability ￿ 2 (0;1) in every
period. The assumption of exogenous exit is adopted here only in the interest of tractability.
Recent evidence suggests that this assumption is a reasonable starting point for analysis. At the
product level, Broda and Weinstein (2010) report that product destruction is much less cyclical
than product creation. A similar pattern also holds at the plant level; using U.S. Census (annual)
data, Lee and Mukoyama￿ s (2007) ￿nd that, while plant entry is highly procyclical (the entry rate
7Thus, the ￿production function￿for new goods is NE;t = ZtLE;t=fE:
9is 8.1 percent in booms and 3.4 percent in recessions), annual exit rates are similar across booms
and recessions (5.8 and 5.1 percent, respectively). They also ￿nd that plants exiting in recessions
are very similar to those exiting in booms (in terms of employment or productivity).
In units of consumption, variety !￿ s price will be set to ￿t (!) ￿ pt (!)=Pt = ￿twt=Zt, where ￿t
is the price markup over marginal cost (anticipating symmetric equilibrium). Given our demand
speci￿cation with endogenous price elasticity of residual demand, this markup is a function of the
number of producers: ￿t = ￿(Nt) ￿ ￿(Nt)=(￿(Nt) + 1): The pro￿ts generated from the sales of
each variety (expressed in units of consumption) are dt (!) = dt =
￿
1 ￿ ￿(Nt)
￿1
￿
Ct=Nt and are
returned to households as dividends.
2.2.1 Preference Speci￿cations and Markups
In our quantitative exercises, we consider two alternative speci￿cations that are nested within
our general analysis of symmetric homothetic preferences. The ￿rst speci￿cation features con-
stant elasticity of substitution between goods as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). For these C.E.S.
preferences, the consumption aggregator is Ct =
￿R
!2￿ ct (!)
￿￿1=￿ d!
￿￿=(￿￿1)
; where ￿ > 1 is
the symmetric elasticity of substitution across goods. The consumption-based price index is
then Pt =
￿R
!2￿t pt (!)
1￿￿ d!
￿1=(1￿￿)
; and the household￿ s demand for each individual good !
is ct (!) = (pt (!)=Pt)
￿￿ Ct. It follows that the markup and the bene￿t of variety are independent
of the number of goods (￿(Nt) = ￿;￿(Nt) = ￿) and related by ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1 = 1=(￿ ￿ 1): The second
speci￿cation uses the translog expenditure function proposed by Feenstra (2003), which introduces
demand-side pricing complementarities. For this preference speci￿cation, the symmetric price elas-
ticity of demand is ￿(1 + ￿Nt), ￿ > 0: As Nt increases, goods become closer substitutes, and the
elasticity of substitution 1+￿Nt increases. If goods are closer substitutes, then the markup ￿(Nt)
and the bene￿t of additional varieties in elasticity form (￿(Nt)) must decrease. This property
occurs whenever the price elasticity of residual demand decreases with quantity consumed along
the residual demand curve. The change in ￿(Nt) is only half the change in net markup generated
by an increase in the number of producers. Table 1 contains the expressions for markup, relative
price, and the bene￿t of variety (the elasticity of ￿ to the number of ￿rms), for each preference
speci￿cation.
102.2.2 Firm Entry and Exit
In every period, there is a mass Nt of ￿rms producing in the economy and an unbounded mass of
prospective entrants. These entrants are forward looking, and correctly anticipate their expected
future pro￿ts ds (!) in every period s ￿ t + 1 as well as the probability ￿ (in every period) of
incurring the exogenous exit-inducing shock. Entrants at time t only start producing at time t+1,
which introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the model. The exogenous exit shock occurs at
the very end of the time period (after production and entry). A proportion ￿ of new entrants will
therefore never produce. Prospective entrants in period t compute their expected post-entry value
(vt (!)) given by the present discounted value of their expected stream of pro￿ts fds (!)g1
s=t+1:
vt (!) = Et
1 X
s=t+1
Qt;sds (!); (1)
where Qt;s is the stochastic discount factor that is determined in equilibrium by the optimal invest-
ment behavior of households. This also represents the value of incumbent ￿rms after production has
occurred (since both new entrants and incumbents then face the same probability 1￿￿ of survival
and production in the subsequent period). Entry occurs until ￿rm value is equalized with the entry
cost, leading to the free entry condition vt (!) = wtfE=Zt. This condition holds so long as the mass
NE;t of entrants is positive. We assume that macroeconomic shocks are small enough for this con-
dition to hold in every period. Finally, the timing of entry and production we have assumed implies
that the number of producing ￿rms during period t is given by Nt = (1 ￿ ￿)(Nt￿1 + NE;t￿1). The
number of producing ￿rms represents the stock of capital of the economy. It is an endogenous state
variable that behaves much like physical capital in the benchmark RBC model, but in contrast to
the latter has an endogenously ￿ uctuating price given by (1).
2.2.3 Symmetric Firm Equilibrium
All ￿rms face the same marginal cost. Hence, equilibrium prices, quantities, and ￿rm values are
identical across ￿rms: pt (!) = pt, ￿t (!) = ￿t, lt (!) = lt, yt (!) = yt, dt (!) = dt, vt (!) = vt.
In turn, equality of prices across ￿rms implies that the consumption-based price index Pt and the
￿rm-level price pt are such that pt=Pt ￿ ￿t = ￿(Nt). An increase in the number of ￿rms implies
necessarily that the relative price of each individual good increases, ￿0 (Nt) > 0. When there are
11more ￿rms, households derive more welfare from spending a given nominal amount, i.e., ceteris
paribus, the price index decreases. It follows that the relative price of each individual good must
rise. The aggregate consumption output of the economy is Nt￿tyt = Ct, which we can rewrite as
Ct = Zt￿(Nt)(Lt ￿ fENE;t=Zt). An increase in the number of entrants NE;t absorbs productive
resources and acts like an overhead labor cost in production of consumption. Importantly, in the
symmetric ￿rm equilibrium, the option value of waiting to enter is zero, despite the presence of
sunk costs and exit risk. This happens because all uncertainty in our model is aggregate, and the
￿death￿shock is symmetric across ￿rms and time-invariant.8
2.3 Household Budget Constraint and Optimal Behavior
Households hold shares in a mutual fund of ￿rms. Let xt be the share in the mutual fund held by
the representative household entering period t. The mutual fund pays a total pro￿t in each period
(in units of currency) equal to the total pro￿t of all ￿rms that produce in that period, PtNtdt.
During period t, the representative household buys xt+1 shares in a mutual fund of Nt+NE;t ￿rms
(those already operating at time t and the new entrants). The mutual fund covers all ￿rms in
the economy, even though only 1 ￿ ￿ of these ￿rms will produce and pay dividends at time t + 1.
The date t price (in units of currency) of a claim to the future pro￿t stream of the mutual fund of
Nt + NE;t ￿rms is equal to the nominal price of claims to future ￿rm pro￿ts, Ptvt.
The household enters period t with mutual fund share holdings xt. It receives dividend income
on mutual fund share holdings, the value of selling its initial share position, and labor income. The
household allocates these resources between purchases of shares to be carried into next period and
consumption. The period budget constraint (in units of consumption) is:
vt (Nt + NE;t)xt+1 + Ct = (dt + vt)Ntxt + wtLt: (2)
The household maximizes its expected intertemporal utility subject to (2).
The Euler equations for share holdings is:
vt = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et
￿
Ct
Ct+1
(vt+1 + dt+1)
￿
:
8See the Appendix for the proof. This contrasts with i.a. Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Campbell (1998).
See also Jovanovic (2006) for a more recent contribution in that vein.
12As expected, forward iteration of the equation for share holdings and absence of speculative bub-
bles yield the asset price solution in equation (1), with the stochastic discount factor Qt;s =
[￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
s Ct=Ct+s.
Finally, the allocation of labor e⁄ort obeys the standard intratemporal ￿rst-order condition:
￿(Lt)
1
’ =
wt
Ct
: (3)
2.4 Aggregate Accounting, Labor Market Dynamics, and the Relation with RBC
Theory
Di⁄erent from the benchmark, one-sector, RBC model of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and many
other studies, our model economy is a two-sector economy in which one sector employs part of the
labor supply to produce consumption and the other sector employs the rest of the labor supply to
produce new ￿rms. Labor market equilibrium requires that these two components of labor demand
sum to aggregate labor supply: LC
t + LE
t = Lt, where LC
t = Ntlt is the total amount of labor used
in production of consumption, and LE
t = NE;tfE=Zt is labor used to create new ￿rms.
Aggregating the budget constraint (2) across households and imposing the equilibrium condition
xt+1 = xt = 1 8t yields the aggregate accounting identity for GDP Yt ￿ Ct+NE;tvt = wtLt+Ntdt.
Total consumption, Ct; plus investment (in new products or ￿rms) NE;tvt; must be equal to total
income (labor income wtLt plus dividend income Ntdt). Thus, vt is the relative price of the invest-
ment ￿good￿in terms of consumption. In a one-sector RBC model, only the interest rate dictates
the allocation of resources between consumption and investment. In our model, this allocation is
re￿ ected in the allocation of labor across the two sectors (producing consumption goods and new
goods). The key distinction is that the relative price of investment vt ￿ uctuates and dictates the al-
location of labor across sectors, in conjunction with the return on shares, rE
t+1 ￿ (vt+1 + dt+1)=vt.
This is reminiscent of a two-sector RBC model9 where the relative price of investment is also
endogenous and a⁄ects the allocation of resources to consumption versus investment.
Despite this similarity, there are important features that di⁄erentiate our framework from a two-
sector RBC structure: First, we model explicitly the microeconomic incentives for product creation
from consumer love for variety and pro￿t incentives for innovators; Second, we have a di⁄erent
9See e.g. Long and Plosser (1983) and Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001).
13notion of investment, directed entirely toward the extensive margin (the creation of new goods),
whereas all investment takes place at the intensive margin (machines used to produce more of the
same good) in the RBC model (one-sector or two-sector). Both forms of investment take place
in reality, and the version of our model introduced in Section 4 addresses this; Third, our model
can address facts about entry, pro￿ts, and markups. A two-sector RBC model that is otherwise
isomorphic to ours would need the ad hoc assumption of a labor share in consumption output that
is an appropriate function of capital to generate a procyclical labor share in GDP (as our model
does under translog preferences); Fourth, since aggregate production of consumption in our model
features a form of increasing returns due to variety, one needs to introduce increasing returns in the
consumption sector of the RBC model to make it isomorphic to ours. But since internal increasing
returns are inconsistent with perfect competition, one needs to adopt the ad hoc assumption of a
labor externality in the consumption sector to avoid internal increasing returns at the ￿rm level
(or otherwise assume that ￿rms price at average cost).10 For these reasons, and its traditional role
as benchmark, we keep the one-sector RBC model as reference point for performance comparison
below.
2.5 Model Summary
Table 2 summarizes the main equilibrium conditions of the model (the labor market equilibrium
condition is redundant once the variety e⁄ect equation is included). The equations in the table
constitute a system of nine equations in nine endogenous variables: ￿t; ￿t; dt; wt;Lt; NE;t; Nt; vt;
Ct. Of these endogenous variables, one is predetermined as of time t: the total number of ￿rms,
Nt. Additionally, the model features one exogenous variable: aggregate productivity, Zt.
2.6 Steady State
We assume that productivity is constant in steady state and denote steady-state levels of variables
by dropping the time subscript: Zt = Z. We conjecture that all endogenous variables are constant
in steady state and show that this is indeed the case. We de￿ne the steady-state interest rate as a
function of the rate of time preference, 1+r ￿ ￿￿1. We exploit this below to treat r as a parameter
10Evidence in Harrison (2003) does not support the assumptions needed to make the models isomorphic. In
particular, Harrison ￿nds that returns to scale are slightly increasing in the investment sector, but they are decreasing
or constant in the consumption sector.
14in the solution. The full steady-state solution is presented in the Appendix. Here, we present the
most important long-run properties of our model.
The gross return on shares is 1+d=v = (1+r)=(1￿￿), which captures a premium for expected
￿rm destruction. The number of new entrants makes up for the exogenous destruction of existing
￿rms: NE = ￿N=(1 ￿ ￿). Calculating the shares of pro￿t income and investment in consumption
output and GDP allows us to draw another transparent comparison between our model and the stan-
dard RBC setup. The steady-state pro￿t equation gives the share of pro￿t income in consumption
output: dN=C = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿. Using this result in conjunction with those obtained above, we have
the share of investment in consumption output, denoted by ￿: vNE=C = ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿=[￿(r + ￿)].
This expression is similar to its RBC counterpart. There, the share of investment in output is
given by sK￿=(r + ￿); where ￿ is the depreciation rate of capital and sK is the share of capital
income in total income. In our framework, (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ can be regarded as governing the share of
￿capital￿since it dictates the degree of monopoly power and hence the share of pro￿ts that ￿rms
generate from producing consumption output (dN=C). Noting that Y = C+ vNE, the shares of
investment and pro￿t income in GDP are vNE=Y = ￿=(1 + ￿) and dN=Y = [(r + ￿)￿]=[￿ (1 + ￿)],
respectively. It follows that the share of consumption in GDP is C=Y = 1=(1 + ￿). The share of
labor income in total income is wL=Y = 1￿[(r + ￿)￿]=[￿ (1 + ￿)]. Importantly, all these ratios are
constant. If we allowed for long-run growth (either via an exogenous trend in Zt, or endogenously
by assuming entry cost fE=Nt as in Grossman and Helpman, 1991), these long-run ratios would still
be constant with C.E.S. preferences, consistent with the Kaldorian growth facts. In fact, regardless
of preference speci￿cation within the homothetic class, our model￿ s long-run properties with growth
would be consistent with two stylized facts originally found by Kaldor (1957): a constant share
of pro￿ts in total capital, dN=vN = (r + d)=(1 ￿ d), and, relatedly, a high correlation between
the pro￿t share in GDP and the investment share in GDP. These facts are absent from both the
standard RBC model and the frictionless entry models discussed in Section 5.
We abstract from growth for two reasons (beyond the fact that it is the subject of its own
extensive literature). In variety-based models, endogenous growth occurs whenever costs of product
creation decrease with the number of existing products; in other words, the production function for
new goods exhibits constant returns to scale in an accumulating factor, viz., the number of goods.
The growth rate in such models (such as in the standard AK model) is a function of the level of
15productivity: Any shock to productivity would immediately put the economy on the new balanced
growth path with no transition dynamics. We focus instead on short-run ￿ uctuations where the
extensive margin does play a signi￿cant role in propagating shocks. Second, the growth rate is
also a function of the elasticity of substitution between goods, which is not constant (in general) in
our model. Reconciling an endogenous time-varying markup with stylized growth facts (that imply
constant markups and pro￿t shares in the long run) is a challenge to growth theory that is worth
future investigation but is beyond the scope of this paper.11
2.7 Dynamics
We solve for the dynamics in response to exogenous shocks by log-linearizing the model around the
steady state. However, the model summary in Table 2 already allows us to draw some conclusions on
the properties of shock responses for some key endogenous variables. It is immediate to verify that
￿rm value is such that vt = wtfE=Zt = fE￿(Nt)=￿(Nt). Since the number of producing ￿rms is
predetermined and does not react to exogenous shocks on impact, ￿rm value is predetermined with
respect to productivity shocks. An increase in productivity results in a proportional increase in the
real wage on impact through its e⁄ect on labor demand. Since the entry cost is paid in e⁄ective labor
units, this does not a⁄ect ￿rm value. An implication of the wage schedule wt = Zt￿(Nt)=￿(Nt) is
that also marginal cost, wt=Zt, is predetermined with respect to the shock.
We can reduce the system in Table 2 to a system of two equations in two variables, Nt and Ct
(see the Appendix). Using sans-serif fonts to denote percent deviations from steady-state levels,
log-linearization around the steady state under assumptions of log-normality and homoskedasticity
yields:
Nt+1 =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ +
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿ +
￿
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
+ ￿
￿
’(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
Nt ￿
￿
’
￿
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
+ ￿
￿
+
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
Ct (4)
+ (1 + ’)
￿
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
+ ￿
￿
Zt;
Ct =
1 ￿ ￿
1 + r
EtCt+1 ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
1 + r
(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿
r + ￿
1 + r
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
Nt+1 + (￿ ￿ ￿)Nt; (5)
where ￿ ￿ ￿0 (N)N=￿(N) ￿ 0 is the elasticity of the markup function with respect to N;which takes
11Balanced growth would be restored under translog preferences by making the ad hoc assumption that the para-
meter ￿ decreases at the same rate at which Nt increases in the long run.
16the value of 0 under C.E.S and ￿(1 + ￿N)
￿1 under translog preferences. Equation (4) states that
the number of ￿rms producing at t+1 increases if consumption at time t is lower (households save
more in the form of new ￿rms) or if productivity is higher. Equation (5) states that consumption
at time t is higher the higher expected future consumption and the larger the number of ￿rms
producing at time t. The e⁄ect of Nt+1 depends on parameter values. For realistic parameter
values, we have ￿ ￿ ￿ > (r + ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿): An increase in the number of ￿rms producing at t + 1
is associated with lower consumption at t. (Higher productivity at time t lowers contemporaneous
consumption through this channel, as households save to ￿nance faster entry in a more attractive
economy. However, we shall see below that the general equilibrium e⁄ect of higher productivity
will be that consumption rises.)
In the Appendix, we show that the system (4)-(5) has a unique, non-explosive solution for any
possible parametrization. To solve the system, we assume Zt = ￿ZZt￿1+"Z;t, where "Z;t is an i.i.d.,
Normal innovation with zero mean and variance ￿2
"Z.
3 Business Cycles: Propagation and Second Moments
In this section we explore the properties of our model by means of a numerical example. We
compute impulse responses to a productivity shock. The responses substantiate the results and
intuitions in the previous section. Then, we compute second moments of our arti￿cial economy and
compare them to second moments in the data and those produced by a standard RBC model.12
3.1 Empirically Relevant Variables and Calibration
An issue of special importance when comparing our model to properties of the data concerns
the treatment of variety e⁄ects. As argued in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), when discussing model
properties in relation to empirical evidence, it is important to recognize that empirically relevant
variables ￿as opposed to welfare-consistent concepts ￿net out the e⁄ect of changes in the range
of available products. The reason is that construction of CPI data by statistical agencies does
not adjust for availability of new products as in the welfare-consistent price index. Furthermore,
adjustment for variety, when it happens, certainly neither happens at the frequency represented by
12Numerical results are obtained using the Matlab Toolkit described in Uhlig (1999).
17periods in our model, nor using one of the speci￿c functional forms for preferences that our model
assumes. It follows that CPI data are closer to pt than Pt. For this reason, when investigating the
properties of the model in relation to the data, one should focus on real variables de￿ ated by a data-
consistent price index. For any variable Xt in units of the consumption basket (other than the return
to investment), we de￿ne its data-consistent counterpart as XR;t ￿ PtXt=pt = Xt=￿t = Xt=￿(Nt).
We de￿ne the data-consistent return to investment using data-consistent share prices and dividends
as rE
R;t+1 ￿ (vR;t+1 + dR;t+1)=vR;t.
In our baseline calibration, we interpret periods as quarters and set ￿ = 0:99 to match a 4 percent
annualized average interest rate. We set the size of the exogenous ￿rm exit shock ￿ = 0:025: This
implies a 10% annual production destruction rate (both as a share of products as well as market
share) and is consistent with the Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) ￿nding of an 8:8% minimum
production destruction rate (measured as a market share).13 Under C.E.S. preferences, we use
the value of ￿ from Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and set ￿ = 3:8, which was
calibrated to ￿t U.S. plant and macro trade data. In our model, this choice implies a share of
investment in GDP (vRNE=YR = vNE=Y ) around 16 percent.14 We calibrate the parameter ￿
under translog preferences to ensure equality of steady-state markup and number of ￿rms across
preference speci￿cations as described in the Appendix. This implies ￿ = 0:35323. We set steady-
state productivity to Z = 1. The entry cost fE does not a⁄ect any impulse response under
C.E.S. preferences and under translog preferences with our calibration procedure. Therefore, we
set fE = 1 without loss of generality (basically, changing fE amounts to changing the unit of
measure for output and number of ￿rms). We set the weight of the disutility of labor in the period
utility function, ￿, so that the steady-state level of labor e⁄ort is equal to 1 ￿and steady-state
levels of all variables are the same ￿regardless of ’. This requires ￿ = 0:924271. This choice is a
mere normalization with no e⁄ect on the quantitative results. We set the elasticity of labor supply
’ to 4 for consistency with King and Rebelo￿ s (1999) calibration of the benchmark RBC model, to
13This calibration also implies a 10% annual job destruction rate, which is consistent with the empirical evidence.
14It may be argued that the value of ￿ results in a steady-state markup that is too high relative to the evidence.
However, it is important to observe that, in models without any ￿xed cost, ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) is a measure of both markup
over marginal cost and average cost. In our model with entry costs, free entry ensures that ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts
net of the entry cost. This means that ￿rms price at average cost (inclusive of the entry cost). Thus, although
￿ = 3:8 implies a fairly high markup over marginal cost, our parametrization delivers reasonable results with respect
to pricing and average costs. The main qualitative features of the impulse responses below are not a⁄ected if we set
￿ = 6, resulting in a 20 percent markup of price over marginal cost as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and several
other studies.
18which we will compare our results.15
We use the same productivity process as King and Rebelo (1999), with persistence ￿Z = 0:979
and standard deviation of innovations ￿"Z = 0:0072 to facilitate comparison of results with the
baseline RBC setup. In King and Rebelo￿ s benchmark RBC model with Cobb-Douglas production,
the exogenous productivity process coincides with the Solow residual by construction, and persis-
tence and the standard deviation of innovations are obtained by ￿tting an AR(1) process to Solow
residual data. In our model, the aggregate GDP production function is not Cobb-Douglas, and
hence the Solow residual does not coincide with exogenous productivity. In fact, it is not clear how
one should de￿ne the Solow residual in our model to account for capital accumulation through the
stock of ￿rms Nt.16 Moreover, the Solow residual (however de￿ned) is just another endogenous
variable in our model. We could try to match its moments to the estimates in King and Rebelo
(1999), but we would face the same di¢ culty as for other endogenous variables￿ that our model,
like the RBC model, does not generate enough endogenous persistence. We therefore opt for the
same parameter values for the exogenous productivity process as in King and Rebelo (1999). In
so doing, we place the test of the model￿ s ability to outperform the RBC model (based on the
standard benchmark against a set of macroeconomic aggregates) on the transmission mechanism
rather than on the implications of di⁄erent parameter choices for the exogenous driving force. This
makes the comparison between models much more transparent.
3.2 Impulse Responses
Figure 1 shows the responses of key endogenous variables to a 1 percent positive innovation to
Zt under C.E.S. preferences. The number of years after the shock is on the horizontal axis. The
responses for all real variables are shown using both the welfare-relevant price index Pt (represented
as dots) and the data-consistent CPI price index pt (represented as crosses). Both measures are
important. The data-consistent series provides the link back to the empirical evidence. On the
other hand, the dynamics are driven by optimizing behavior with respect to their welfare-relevant
counterparts.
15The period utility function is de￿ned over leisure (1 ￿ Lt) in King and Rebelo (1999), where the endowment of
time in each period is normalized to 1. The elasticity of labor supply is then the risk aversion to variations in leisure
(set to 1 in their benchmark calibration) multiplied by (1 ￿ L)=L, where L is steady-state e⁄ort, calibrated to 1=5.
This yields ’ = 4 in our speci￿cation.
16This issue is still relevant for our model extension with physical capital in Section 4.
19Consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of the shock on impact. Note that the relative price ￿t ￿ pt=Pt depends
only on the number of products Nt, and is thus pre-determined at time t. The impact responses for
both the data- and welfare-consistent measures are thus identical. The productivity improvement
spurs pro￿t expectations generated by the increased demand for all individual goods yt. Absent any
entry, this would translate into a higher (ex-ante) value for each variety. However, the free entry
mechanism induces an immediate response of entry that drives the (ex-post) equilibrium value of
a variety back down to the level of the entry cost; recall that this is equal to the marginal cost of
producing an extra unit of an existing good. Since marginal cost (and hence the entry cost) moves
in lockstep with the -constant on impact- individual relative price (￿t), it follows that on impact
there is no reaction in marginal cost; Therefore, entry occurs up to the point where the (ex-post)
equilibrium ￿rm value does not react to the shock on impact.
The remaining question is then what is the optimal relative allocation of the productivity
increase between the two sectors: consumption Ct and investment (entry) NE;t. To understand
why consumption increases less than proportionally with productivity it is important to consider
the investment decision of households. The price of a share (value of a ￿rm) together with its
payo⁄ (dividends obtained from monopolistic ￿rms) determine the return on a share: the return
to entry (product creation). On impact, the rate of return to investing (rE
t+1, evaluated from the
ex ante perspective of investment decisions) is high, both because the present share price is low
relative to the future and because next period￿ s share payo⁄s (￿rm pro￿ts) are expected to be
high. Intertemporal substitution logic implies that the household should postpone consumption
into the future; Since the only means to transfer resources intertemporally is the introduction of
new varieties, investment (measured either as the number of entrants NE;t or in consumption units
IE
t ￿ vtNE;t) increases on impact; This is the mirror (￿demand￿ ) image of the new ￿rms￿decision
to enter discussed earlier. This allocation of resources, driven by intertemporal substitution, is
also re￿ ected in the allocation of labor across the two sectors: On impact, labor is reallocated into
product creation (LE
t ) from the production of existing goods (LC
t ).17 Lastly, the real wage increases
on impact in line with the increase in productivity; and faced with this higher wage, the household
17The negative correlation between labor inputs in the two sectors of our economy is inconsistent with evidence
concerning sectoral comovement. This feature, however, is shared by all multi-sector models in which labor is perfectly
mobile (see Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1998, for an early review of the evidence and implications for a two-sector
RBC model). One natural way to induce comovement would be to introduce costs of reallocating labor across sectors
as in Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001).
20optimally decides to work more hours in order to attain a higher consumption level. GDP (Yt)
increases because both consumption and investment increase.
Over time, increased entry translates into a gradual increase in the number of products Nt
and reduces individual good demand (output of each good falls below the steady state for most
of the transition). More product variety also generates a love-of-variety welfare e⁄ect that is
re￿ ected in the increase in the relative price ￿t. This increase is also re￿ ected one-for-one in the
welfare-consistent measure of the value of a variety (since the opportunity cost of investment in
terms of foregone consumption is now higher with more varieties). Pro￿ts per variety fall with the
reduction in demand per variety. Together with the higher opportunity cost of investment from
higher product variety, this generates a fall in the return to investment/entry below its steady state
value and a reversal in the allocation of labor: labor is reallocated back from product creation to
production. The hump-shaped pattern of aggregate consumption is consistent with the dynamics
of the return to investment. After a certain amount of time, the number of products peaks, and
then progressively declines back to its old steady state level. This also unwinds the welfare e⁄ects
driven by the additional product variety (￿t decreases). The decrease in product variety is also
re￿ ected in a reversal of the decrease in individual good demand and pro￿ts per-variety, which then
increase back up to their steady state levels. Importantly, however, aggregate pro￿t Dt ￿ Ntdt and
its data consistent counterpart DR;t remain above the steady state throughout the transition. The
response of data-consistent consumption (CR;t) is still hump-shaped, but relatively more muted
than its welfare consistent counterpart as it does not factor in the additional bene￿ts from product
variety. The data-consistent ￿rm value is constant because with C.E.S. preferences the markup is
constant, namely vR;t = fE=￿ = fE (￿ ￿ 1)=￿. Finally, the data-consistent real wage wR;t declines
monotonically toward the steady state, tracking the behavior of productivity.18
Figure 2 repeats the experiment of Figure 1 for the case of translog preferences. The qualitative
behavior of several variables is similar to the C.E.S. case, but key di⁄erences emerge. With translog
preferences, varieties become closer substitutes as the increased product variety induces a crowding-
out e⁄ect in product space. These demand side changes, in turn, lead to lower markups. Relative to
18The welfare-consistent real wage wt increase by more than productivity in all periods after impact, because a
higher number of ￿rms puts upward pressure on labor demand. With logarithmic utility from consumption, labor
supply depends on wt=Ct = wR;t=CR;t. In other words, variety has no e⁄ect on labor supply. This would no longer
be the case with a di⁄erent utility function.
21C.E.S., the pro￿t incentive for product creation is thus weaker, and is re￿ ected in a muted response
of entry. However, the hump-shape response for overall product variety is still very similar to the
C.E.S. case, and this induces the countercyclical response of the markup, ￿t, which declines over
time before settling on the path back to the steady state.19 The muted response of the relative
price under translog preferences implies that individual ￿rm output does not drop below the steady
state during the transition (as it did in the C.E.S. case): it is relatively more pro￿table to keep
producing old goods, since investing in new ones erodes pro￿t margins and yields a smaller welfare
gain to consumers. This is also evident in the dynamics of labor across sectors: the reallocation of
labor from product creation back into the production of existing goods takes place faster than in
the C.E.S. case.
Importantly, although markups are countercyclical, aggregate pro￿ts (both welfare- and data-
consistent) remain strongly pro-cyclical. It is notoriously di¢ cult to generate both countercyclical
markups and procyclical aggregate pro￿ts in models with a constant number of producers/products
(for instance, based on sticky prices). These models imply that pro￿ts become countercyclical, in
stark contrast with the data (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). Our model naturally breaks
this link between the responses of markups and aggregate pro￿ts via the endogenous ￿ uctuation
in the number of products. Procyclical product entry pushes up aggregate pro￿ts relative to the
change in the product-level markup. We return to this issue when computing the second moments
of our arti￿cial economy below.20
Finally, we note that these responses di⁄er from the e¢ cient ones generated by solving the social
planner￿ s problem for our economy. There is the standard markup distortion of the di⁄erentiated
goods relative to leisure (this is also a feature of models without endogenous entry). Moreover, an
intertemporal distortion occurs when the markups on goods are not synchronized over time. Lastly,
endogenous entry generates another distortion whenever the incentives for entry are not aligned
with the welfare bene￿t of product variety. The C.E.S. preferences introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz
19The ￿ uctuations of the markup over time, also generate di⁄erences relative to the C.E.S. responses for data-
consistent measures. For example, the data consistent value of a variety vR;t = fE=￿(Nt) increases with the markup,
since the latter implies a higher opportunity cost of foregone production.
20A discussion of the responses to a permanent increase in productivity can be found in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007), along with a discussion of the consequences of di⁄erent values for the elasticity of labor supply. The most
salient feature of the responses to a permanent shock is that, with C.E.S. preferences, GDP expansion takes place
entirely at the intensive margin in the short run, while it is entirely driven by the extensive margin (with ￿rm-level
output back at the initial steady state) in the long run. With translog preferences, extensive and intensive margin
adjustments coexist in the long run.
22(1977) represent a knife-edge case that eliminates those last two distortions. On the other hand,
the translog case compounds all three distortions. See Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008a) for a
detailed discussion of these distortions and the associated planner remedies.
3.3 Second Moments
To further evaluate the properties of our baseline model, we compute the implied second moments
of our arti￿cial economy for some key macroeconomic variables and compare them to those of the
data and those produced by the benchmark RBC model. While discussing the behavior of welfare-
consistent variables was important to understand the impulse responses above, here we focus only
on empirically relevant variables, as we compare the implications of the model to the data. Table
3 presents the results for our C.E.S. model.21 In each column, the ￿rst number (bold fonts) is
the empirical moment implied by the U.S. data reported in King and Rebelo (1999), the second
number (normal fonts) is the moment implied by our model, and the third number (italics) is the
moment generated by King and Rebelo￿ s baseline RBC model. We compute model-implied second
moments for HP-￿ltered variables for consistency with data and standard RBC practice, and we
measure investment in our model with the real value of household investment in new ￿rms (vRNE).
Remarkably, the performance of the simplest model with entry subject to sunk costs and con-
stant markups is similar to that of the baseline RBC model in reproducing some key features of
U.S. business cycles. Our model fares better insofar as reproducing the volatilities of output and
hours. The ratio between model and data standard deviations of output is 0:90, compared to
0:77 for the standard RBC model; and the standard deviation of hours is 50 percent larger than
that implied by the RBC model. On the other hand, investment is too volatile, and our baseline
framework faces the same well-known di¢ culties of the standard RBC model: Consumption is
too smooth relative to output; there is not enough endogenous persistence (as indicated by the
￿rst-order autocorrelations); and all variables are too procyclical relative to the data.
Additionally, however, our model can jointly reproduce important facts about product creation
and the dynamics of pro￿ts and markups: procyclical entry (as reviewed in the Introduction),
procyclical pro￿ts, and, in the version with translog preferences, countercyclical markups. To
21The moments in Table 3 change only slightly under translog preferences, without a⁄ecting the main conclusions.
Details are available upon request.
23substantiate this point, Figure 3 plots model-generated cross-correlations of entry, aggregate real
pro￿ts, and GDP for C.E.S preferences and translog preferences. In both cases, entry and pro￿ts
are strongly procyclical, and the contemporaneous correlation of pro￿ts and entry is positive.22
Figure 4 shows the model-generated correlation of the markup with GDP at various lags and leads
under translog preferences, comparing it to that documented by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
Our model almost perfectly reproduces the contemporaneous countercyclicality of the markup;
furthermore, the time pro￿le of its correlation with the business cycle also matches well with the
empirical evidence.23 There is a straightforward intuition for this result, which follows from the
slow movement of the number of ￿rms in our model: When productivity increases, GDP increases
on impact and then declines toward the steady state, while the number of ￿rms builds up gradually
before returning to the steady state. Since the markup is a decreasing function of the number of
￿rms, it also falls gradually in response to a technology shocks. As a consequence, the markup is
more negatively correlated with lags of GDP and positively correlated with its leads.
We view the performance of our model as a relative success. First, the model, although based
on a di⁄erent propagation mechanism from which traditional physical capital is absent, has second
moment properties that are comparable to the RBC model concerning macroeconomic variables of
which that model speaks; indeed, our model fares better insofar as generating output and hours
volatility is concerned. Second, our model can explain (at least qualitatively) stylized facts about
which the benchmark RBC model is silent. Third, to the best our knowledge, our model is the ￿rst
that can account for all these additional facts simultaneously: Earlier models that address entry
(such as those we discuss in Section 5) fail to account for the cyclicality of pro￿ts (since they assume
entry subject to a period-by-period zero pro￿t condition), and models that generate procyclical
pro￿ts (due to monopolistic competition) abstract from changes in product space. Finally, we view
the ability to generate procyclical pro￿ts with a countercyclical markup and to reproduce the time
22In Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007), we show that the tent-shaped patterns in Figure 3 are not too distant from
reproducing the evidence for net ￿rm entry as measured by the di⁄erence between new incorporations and failures.
23Of the various labor share-based empirical measures of the markup considered by Rotemberg and Woodford, the
one that is most closely related to the markup in our model is the version with overhead labor, whose cyclicality
is reported in column 2 of their Table 2, page 1066, and reproduced in Figure 4. In our model, the inverse of the
markup is equal to the share of production labor (labor net of workers in the ￿investment￿sector who develop new
products) in total consumption: 1=￿t = [wt (Lt ￿ LE;t)]=Ct. This also implies that the share of aggregate pro￿ts
in consumption is the remaining share 1 ￿ (1=￿t). Countercyclical markups therefore entail a countercyclical pro￿t
share and a procyclical labor share, as documented by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Those authors also measure
shares in consumption rather than GDP. Since the share of consumption in GDP is relatively acyclical, this di⁄erence
in the use of denominators will not be consequential.
24pattern of the markup￿ s correlation with the cycle in the simplest version of our model as major
improvements relative to other (e.g., sticky-price-based) theories of cyclical markup variation.
4 The Role of Physical Capital
We now extend our model and incorporate physical capital as well as the capital embodied in the
stock of available product lines. We explore this for two reasons. First, our benchmark model studies
an extreme case in which all investment goes toward the creation of new production lines and their
associated products. While this is useful to emphasize the new transmission mechanism provided by
producer entry, it is certainly unrealistic: Part of observed investment is accounted for by the need to
augment the capital stock used in production of existing goods. Second, the introduction of physical
capital may improve the model￿ s performance in explaining observed macroeconomic ￿ uctuations.
Since inclusion of capital in the model does not represent a major modeling innovation, we relegate
the presentation of the augmented setup to the Appendix, and limit ourselves to mentioning the
main assumptions here.
We assume that households accumulate the stock of capital (Kt), and rent it to ￿rms producing
at time t in a competitive capital market. Investment in the physical capital stock (It) requires
the use of the same composite of all available varieties as the consumption basket. Physical capital
obeys a standard law of motion with rate of depreciation ￿K 2 (0;1). For simplicity, we follow
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and assume that the creation of new ￿rms does not require physical
capital. Producing ￿rms then use capital and labor to produce goods according to the Cobb-Douglas
production function yt (!) = Ztlt (!)
￿ kt (!)
1￿￿, with 0 < ￿ < 1.
As with the baseline model, we use the model with physical capital to compute second moments
of the simulated economy. Table 4 reports results for key macro aggregates, for C.E.S. preferences
(normal fonts) compared again to data and moments of the baseline RBC model (bold and italic
fonts respectively).24 All parameters take the same values as in Section 3; in addition, the labor
share parameter is set to ￿ = 0:67 and physical capital depreciation to ￿K = 0:025; values that
are standard in the RBC literature (e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). For comparison with investment
24To save space, we do not report impulse responses for the model with capital. These, as well as second moments
for the translog case (which are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those in Table 4 for the relevant variables) are available
upon request.
25data, we now measure investment with the real value of total investment in physical capital and new
￿rm creation, TIR;t ￿ vR;tNE;t+IR;t, where IR;t is real investment in physical capital accumulation.
Inclusion of physical capital alters some of the key second-moment properties of the model rel-
ative to Table 3. In particular, the model with capital reproduces almost the entire data variability
of output and hours worked, thus clearly outperforming both our baseline and the RBC model (the
ratio between model and data standard deviations of output is 0:97, while the relative standard
deviation of hours is twice as large as that implied by the RBC model). The volatility of invest-
ment is also much closer to its data counterpart (whereas in our baseline model without physical
capital investment was too volatile). On a more negative note, the model still generates too smooth
consumption, fails to reproduce persistence, and overstates correlations; all these shortcomings are
shared with the baseline RBC model and many of its extensions. Lastly, the correlations pertain-
ing to entry, pro￿ts, and markup are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected with respect to the baseline model
without physical capital (results available upon request). In summary, we show that the incorpo-
ration of physical capital signi￿cantly a⁄ects some of the business cycle properties of the model, in
particular those pertaining to volatility of output, hours, and investment, bringing them closer to
the data.
5 Discussion: Entry in Business Cycle Models
We argued that the introduction of endogenous producer entry and product variety is a promising
avenue for business cycle research, for the ability of the mechanism to explain several features
of evidence and improve upon the basic RBC setup. To be fair, ours is not the ￿rst paper that
introduces producer entry in a business cycle framework. But our model di⁄ers from earlier ones
along important dimensions. In this section, we discuss the relation between our model and earlier
models with producer entry, as well as some recent studies in the same vein.
Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996a,b) documented the
procyclical nature of entry and developed general equilibrium models with monopolistic competition
to study the e⁄ect of entry and exit on the dynamics of the business cycle. However, entry is
frictionless in their models: There is no sunk entry cost, and ￿rms enter instantaneously in each
period until all pro￿t opportunities are exploited. A ￿xed period-by-period cost then serves to
26bound the number of operating ￿rms. Free-entry implies zero pro￿ts in all periods, and the number
of producing ￿rms in each period is not a state variable. Thus, these models cannot jointly address
the procyclicality of pro￿ts and entry. In contrast, entry in our model is subject to a sunk entry
cost and a time-to-build lag, and the free entry condition equates the expected present discounted
value of pro￿ts to the sunk cost.25 Thus, pro￿ts are allowed to vary and the number of ￿rms is a
state variable in our model, consistent with evidence and the widespread view that the number of
producing ￿rms is ￿xed in the short run.26 Finally, our model exhibits a steady state in which: (i)
The share of pro￿ts in capital is constant and (ii) the share of investment is positively correlated with
the share of pro￿ts. These are among the Kaldorian growth facts outlined in Cooley and Prescott
(1995), which neither the standard RBC model nor the frictionless entry model can account for
(the former because it is based on perfect competition, the latter because the share of pro￿ts is
zero).
Entry subject to sunk costs, with the implications that we stressed above, also distinguishes
our model from more recent contributions such as Comin and Gertler (2006) and Jaimovich and
Floetotto (2008), who also assume a period-by-period, zero-pro￿t condition.27 Our model further
di⁄ers from Comin and Gertler￿ s along three dimensions: (i) We focus on a standard de￿nition of
the business cycle, whereas they focus on the innovative notion of ￿medium term￿cycles; (ii) Our
model generates countercyclical markups due to demand-side pricing complementarities, whereas
Comin and Gertler, like Gal￿ (1995), postulate a function for markups which is decreasing in
the number of ￿rms; (iii) Our model features exogenous, RBC-type productivity shocks, whereas
Comin and Gertler consider endogenous technology and use wage markup shocks as the source
25The pattern of product creation and destruction documented by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) and Broda
and Weinstein (2010) is also most consistent with sunk product development costs subject to uncertainty ￿as featured
in our model.
26In fact, our model features a ￿xed number of producing ￿rms within each period and a fully ￿ exible number
of ￿rms in the long run. Ambler and Cardia (1998) and Cook (2001) take a ￿rst step in our direction. A period-
by-period zero pro￿t condition holds only in expectation in their models, allowing for ex post pro￿t variation in
response to unexpected shocks, and the number of ￿rms in each period is predetermined relative to shocks in that
period. Benassy (1996) analyzes the persistence properties of a variant of the model developed by Devereux, Head,
and Lapham (1996a,b).
27Sunk entry costs are a feature of Hopenhayn and Rogerson￿ s (1993) model, which is designed to analyze the
employment consequences of ￿rm entry and exit, and thus directly addresses the evidence in Davis, Haltiwanger, and
Schuh (1996). However, Hopenhayn and Rogerson assume perfect competition in goods markets (as in Hopenhayn￿ s,
1992, seminal model) and abstract from aggregate dynamics by focusing on stationary equilibria in which prices,
employment, output, and the number of ￿rms are all constant. Lewis (2006) builds on the framework of this
paper and estimates VAR responses (including those of pro￿ts and entry as measured by net business formation) to
macroeconomic shocks, ￿nding support for the sunk-cost driven dynamics predicted by our model.
27of business cycles. The source of cyclical movements in markups further di⁄erentiates our work
from Jaimovich and Floetotto￿ s (and Cook, 2001 ), where countercyclical markups occur due to
supply-side considerations ￿ i.e., increased competition leading to lower markups. We prefer a
demand-, preference-based explanation for countercyclical markups since data suggest that most
of the entering and exiting ￿rms are small, and much of the change in the product space is due
to product switching within existing ￿rms rather than entry of entirely new ￿rms, pointing to
a limited role for supply-driven competitive pressures in explaining markup dynamics over the
business cycle.28
A lively literature has emerged in the last few years that focuses on the role of producer entry
and exit in the business cycle, in some cases building on our framework. Samaniego (2008) explores
the issue in the heterogeneous establishment model with perfect competition of Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). He argues that entry and exit play little role in aggregate ￿ uctuations. Lee
and Mukoyama (2007) also build on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), but they conclude that the
determinants of entry and exit are important for their model to match the data, and they point
to the sensitivity of Samaniego￿ s results to his assumptions on entry costs. Our entry setup di⁄ers
by virtue of the assumption of imperfect competition. As we showed, this allows entry to explain
features of the business cycle (such as markup dynamics) that pose a challenge to other models.
Moreover, di⁄erent from Samaniego, we take a broader view of entry and exit as product creation
and destruction that take place over the length of a cycle, rather than purely entry and exit of
establishments.29 Other strands of the literature have focused on the consequences of alternative
production and labor market structures and modes of competition for macroeconomic dynamics.
For instance, Wang and Wen (2007) argue that producer entry as in our model and a Leontief
production structure can reconcile ￿ exible-price business cycle modeling with the evidence on the
responses to technology shocks in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) and Gal￿ (1999). Shao and
Silos (2008) extend our model to incorporate search and matching in the labor market. They
argue that ￿rm entry introduces an endogenously time-varying value of vacancy creation, which
contributes to the volatility of unemployment and generates an empirically-plausible relationship
between vacancies and unemployment. Colciago and Etro (2008) extend our model to consider
28Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006) motivate markup ￿ uctuations in their model with the in￿ uence of ￿animal
spirits￿that a⁄ect ￿rm entry and exit decisions.
29Sim (2007) develops a version of our model with heterogeneous productivity and endogenous producer exit.
28Cournot and Bertrand competition as sources of markup variation, and they ￿nd that the extended
model performs better than the RBC setup at matching impulse responses and business cycle
moments for U.S. data.30
6 Conclusions
We developed a model of business cycle transmission with an endogenous number of producers and
products subject to sunk entry costs, a time-to-build lag, and exogenous risk of ￿rm destruction.
The assumption of a general structure of homothetic preferences allows the model to nest the fa-
miliar C.E.S. speci￿cation with constant markups and a translog setup with time-varying markups
as special cases. The model shows that variation in the number of producers and products over
the horizon generally associated to the length of a business cycle can be an important propagation
mechanism for ￿ uctuations, consistent with the evidence documented by Bernard, Redding, and
Schott (2010). Our setup explains stylized facts such as the procyclical behavior of entry and prof-
its. Assuming translog preferences, it results in countercyclical markups with procyclical pro￿ts,
resolving a puzzle for models that motivate cyclical markup variation with nominal rigidity; more-
over, our model generates a time pro￿le of the markup￿ s correlation with the business cycle that
is in line with the data. Finally, when it comes to the second moment properties of variables that
are the focus of traditional RBC models, our setup does at least as well as the latter (for a bench-
mark productivity process) and, when we include physical capital, the model can simultaneously
reproduce most of the variance of GDP, hours worked, and total investment found in the data.
There are several directions for future research. We took on the implications of a sticky-price
version of our model for business cycle dynamics and the conduct of monetary policy in Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz (2008b). The analysis of optimal monetary policy in that article is limited
to a ￿rst-best environment in which the policymaker has access to lump-sum ￿scal instruments.
Bilbiie, Fujiwara, and Ghironi (2009) study Ramsey-optimal monetary policy in a more realistic,
second-best world.31 Chugh and Ghironi (2009) focus on optimal ￿scal policy in a second-best
environment.
30The dynamics of producer entry and exit have also received recent attention in a large number of open economy
studies. See, for instance, Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
31See also Bergin and Corsetti (2008) for an analysis of monetary policy in a model with producer entry.
29However, the most important direction that our model points to for future research is empirical.
The evidence reviewed in the Introduction should only be regarded as a preliminary step in the
direction of investigating empirically how much product creation and variety matter for business
cycles. Indeed, our model should be viewed as providing the motivation for a deeper investigation
of the empirical features of product dynamics, in the sense that a model that relies on product
creation has some relative virtues in terms of explaining macroeconomic stylized facts. Ideally,
data on product creation and destruction for a large set and a ￿ne disaggregation of products at
business cycle frequency would be needed for appropriate tests of our theory. Moreover, data on the
product development costs at the same (or comparable) level of disaggregation would be important
to gauge the relevance of sunk costs in determining product introduction over the cycle32. To the
best of our knowledge, this data is hitherto unavailable. Construction and investigation of this data
is a fundamental task for the future.
32This will also make it possible to measure the extent of extensive margin investment in the economy, i.e., the
part of investment in NIPA accounts that goes toward enlarging the set of available goods.
30Appendix
A Homothetic Consumption Preferences
Consider an arbitrary set of homothetic preferences over a continuum of goods ￿. Let p(!) and
c(!) denote the prices and consumption level (quantity) of an individual good ! 2 ￿. These
preferences are uniquely represented by a price index function P ￿ h(p); p ￿ [p(!)]!2￿, such that
the optimal expenditure function is given by PC, where C is the consumption index (the utility
level attained for a monotonic transformation of the utility function that is homogeneous of degree
1). Any function h(p) that is non-negative, non-decreasing, homogeneous of degree 1, and concave,
uniquely represents a set of homothetic preferences. Using the conventional notation for quantities
with a continuum of goods as ￿ ow values, the derived Marshallian demand for any variety ! is then
given by: c(!)d! = C@P=@p(!):s
B No Option Value of Waiting to Enter
Let the option value of waiting to enter for ￿rm ! be ￿t (!) ￿ 0. In all periods t, ￿t (!) =
max[vt (!) ￿ wtfE=Zt;￿￿t+1 (!)];where the ￿rst term is the payo⁄ of undertaking the investment
and the second term is the discounted payo⁄ of waiting. If ￿rms are identical (there is no idio-
syncratic uncertainty) and exit is exogenous (uncertainty related to ￿rm death is common across
￿rms), this becomes: ￿t = max[vt ￿ wtfE=Zt;￿￿t+1]. Because of free entry, the ￿rst term is always
zero, so the option value obeys: ￿t = ￿￿t+1. This is a contraction mapping because of discounting,
and by forward iteration, under the assumption limT!1 ￿T￿t+T = 0 (i.e., there is a zero value of
waiting when reaching the terminal period), the only stable solution for the option value is ￿t = 0.
C Model Solution
We can reduce the system in Table 2 to a system of two equations in two variables, Nt and Ct. To
see this, write ￿rm value as a function of the endogenous state Nt and the exogenous state fE by
combining free entry, the pricing equation, and the markup and variety e⁄ect equations:
vt = fE
￿(Nt)
￿(Nt)
. (C.1)
31The number of new entrants as a function of consumption and number of ￿rms is NE;t =
ZtLt=fE ￿Ct=(fE￿(Nt)). Substituting this, equations (3) and (C.1), and the expression for pro￿ts
in the law of motion for Nt (scrolled one period forward) and the Euler equation for shares yields:
Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
Nt +
Zt
fE
￿
1
Ct
￿(Nt)
￿(Nt)
Zt
￿
￿’
￿
Ct
fE￿(Nt)
￿
; (C.2)
fE
￿(Nt)
￿(Nt)
= ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et
￿
Ct
Ct+1
￿
fE
￿(Nt+1)
￿(Nt+1)
+
￿
1 ￿
1
￿(Nt+1)
￿
Ct+1
Nt+1
￿￿
: (C.3)
Equations (C.2)-(C.3) allow us to solve for the steady-state number of ￿rms and consumption
(and therefore all other variables) by solving the equations:
N = [￿(r + ￿)]
￿’
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
Z
fE
￿1+’
￿
￿(N)￿1
N￿(N)
￿’
￿ + r+￿
￿(N)￿1
; (C.4)
C =
(r + ￿)￿(N)
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(N) ￿ 1)
NfE: (C.5)
In the C.E.S. case, the markup is always equal to a constant: ￿(N) = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1); and the
variety e⁄ect is governed by ￿(N) = N
1
￿￿1: The solution is:
NCES =
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿(r + ￿)
￿
￿￿(r + ￿)
￿(r + ￿) ￿ r
￿ 1
1+’ Z
fE
; (C.6)
CCES =
(r + ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
1 ￿ ￿
fE
￿
NCES￿ ￿
￿￿1 : (C.7)
In the translog case, the steady-state markup function is ￿(N) = 1 + 1=(￿N). The number of
￿rms solves the equation:
N =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
Z
fE
￿1+’ ￿
1
￿(r + ￿)
￿’ [N (1 + ￿N)]
￿’
￿ + ￿N (r + ￿)
￿ H (N); (C.8)
which shows that NTrans is a ￿xed point of the function H (N): Since H (N) is continuous and
limN!0 H (N) = 1 and limN!1 H (N) = 0; H (N) has a unique ￿xed point if and only if H0 (N) ￿
0: Straightforward di⁄erentiation of H (N) shows that this is indeed the case, and hence there exists
a unique NTrans that solves the nonlinear equation (C.8). In the special case of inelastic labor
32(’ = 0), a closed-form solution can be obtained as:
NTrans
’=0 =
￿￿ +
q
￿2 + 4￿ Z
fE (r + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2￿ (r + ￿)
: (C.9)
Steady-state labor e⁄ort under both preference scenarios is:
L =
￿
1
￿
￿
1 ￿
r
￿(r + ￿)
￿￿ ’
1+’
: (C.10)
Note that hours are indeed constant relative to variation in long-run productivity.
In the quantitative exercises below, we use a speci￿c calibration scheme, which ensures that
steady-state number of ￿rms and markup under translog preferences are the same as under C.E.S.
(We make this assumption since we only observe one set of data, and hence only one value for N
and ￿.) We can achieve this for translog preferences by an appropriate choice of the parameter ￿
(denoted with ￿￿ below). The choice of ￿ that ensures equalization of steady states across C.E.S.
and translog preferences can be explained intuitively for the case ’ = 0 with reference to Figure
C1. In the C.E.S. case, the relevant H (N) function is a constant, and the equilibrium is given by
HCES ￿ 1￿￿
￿(r+￿)￿r
Z
fE = N; represented by the dotted horizontal line. The intersection of this with
the 45 degree line determines the number of ￿rms in steady state. Choosing the value of ￿ that
equates the steady-state number of ￿rms across C.E.S. and translog cases (denoted ￿￿) amounts
to choosing the H (N) function for the translog case whose ￿xed point is precisely the same (i.e.,
which crosses the 45 degree line at the same point); this is given by the solid curve in the ￿gure.
Algebraically, this can be achieved as follows in the general case ’ ￿ 0. For any preference
speci￿cation, the steady-state number of ￿rms solves equation (C.4), which can be rewritten as:
N = [￿(r + ￿)]
￿
’
1+’ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
fE
￿
￿(N)￿1
￿(N)
￿ ’
1+’
h
￿ + r+￿
￿(N)￿1
i 1
1+’
: (C.11)
Since the terms up to Z=fE in the right-hand side of this equation are independent of N; equalization
of N for translog and C.E.S. preferences reduces to ensuring that the last fraction is invariant to the
preference speci￿cations. That is, we need to ￿nd the value of ￿ that ensures that NTrans = NCES,
33which holds as long as
￿
1 + ￿NCES￿￿
’
1+’
[￿ + (r + ￿)￿NCES]
1
1+’
=
￿
￿
’
1+’
[￿ + (r + ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)]
1
1+’
;
where we used the expression for NCES in (C.6). It is easily veri￿ed that ￿￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)=NCES
is a solution, and is unique (exploiting monotonicity of the markup function). Substituting the
expression for NCES; the value of ￿￿ can then be written as a function of structural parameters:
￿￿ =
￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
[￿￿(r + ￿)]
’
1+’
[￿(r + ￿) ￿ r]
￿ 1
1+’
fE
Z
:
D Local Equilibrium Determinacy and Non-Explosiveness
To analyze local determinacy and non-explosiveness of the rational expectation equilibrium, we can
focus on the perfect foresight version of the system (4)-(5) and restrict attention to endogenous
variables. Rearranging yields:
2
6
4
Ct+1
Nt+1
3
7
5 = M
2
6
4
Ct
Nt
3
7
5; M ￿
2
6
4
1+r
1￿￿ ￿ ￿ r+￿
￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿ 1+r
1￿￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ r+￿
￿￿1 ￿
3
7
5:
where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ r+￿
1￿￿
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿￿1
￿
and ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ + r+￿
￿￿1￿. Existence of a unique, non-explosive,
rational expectations equilibrium requires that one eigenvalue of M be inside and one outside the
unit circle. The characteristic polynomial of M takes the form J (￿) = ￿2￿(trace(M))￿+det(M);
where the trace is
trace(M) = 1 ￿ ￿ +
1 + r
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
1 ￿
r + ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
+
r + ￿
1 ￿ ￿
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
;
and the determinant
det(M) = 1 + r +
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
1 + r
1 ￿ ￿
￿:
The condition for existence of a unique, non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium is J (￿1)J (1) <
0, where
34J (1) = ￿
r + ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿ +
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
+ ￿
(r + ￿)
2
1 ￿ ￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)
2 < 0 if and only if ￿ <
￿ ￿ 1
￿
r + ￿￿
r + ￿
:
Since ￿ ￿ 0 and the right-hand side of the latter inequality is always positive, this condition is
always satis￿ed. Moreover, J (￿1) = 4 + 2r ￿ J (1) > 0 whenever J (1) < 0; so there exists a
unique, stable, rational expectations equilibrium for any possible parametrization. The elasticity
of the number of ￿rms producing in period t + 1 to its past level is the stable root of J (￿) = 0;
i.e.,
￿
trace(M) ￿
q
(trace(M))
2 ￿ 4det(M)
￿
=2.
E The Model with Physical Capital
On the household side, we now have the capital accumulation equation (It is investment):
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿K)Kt + It; (E.1)
where ￿K 2 (0;1) is the rate of depreciation, which acts as an additional dynamic constraint. The
budget constraint becomes:
Bt+1 + vtNH;txt+1 + Ct + It + Tt = (1 + rt)Bt + (dt + vt)Ntxt + wtLt + rK
t Kt;
where rK
t is the rental rate of capital. Euler equations for bonds and share holdings, and the labor
supply equation, are unchanged. The Euler equation for capital accumulation requires:
1 = ￿Et
"￿
Ct+1
Ct
￿￿1 ￿
rK
t+1 + 1 ￿ ￿K￿
#
: (E.2)
On the ￿rm side, the production function is now Cobb-Douglas in labor and capital: yt (!) =
Ztlt (!)
￿ kt (!)
1￿￿ : When ￿ = 1, this model reduces to our previous model without physical capital.
Imposing symmetry of the equilibrium, cost minimization taking factor prices wt; rK
t as given
implies:
rK
t = (1 ￿ ￿)
yt
kt
￿t; wt = ￿
yt
lt
￿t; (E.3)
35where ￿t is marginal cost. The pro￿t function becomes dt = ￿tyt ￿ wtlt ￿ rK
t kt; where optimal
pricing yields ￿t = ￿t￿t: Finally, market clearing for physical capital requires:
Kt+1 = Nt+1kt+1; (E.4)
since capital entering t + 1 is rent to ￿rms that are producing at time t + 1. Importantly, at the
end of the period (when the capital market clears) there is a ￿ reshu› ing￿of capital among ￿rms
such that there is no scrap value for the capital of disappearing ￿rms. The other equations remain
unchanged.
We have thus introduced ￿ve new variables: Kt; kt ;It; rK
t ; ￿t, and ￿ve new equations (all the
equations displayed above except for the budget constraint). We can write the equations as in the
version without capital, using only aggregate variables. Take factor prices, multiply numerator and
denominator by Nt, and substitute out marginal cost from the pricing equation:
rK
t = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿t
￿t
Ntyt
Ntkt
=
1 ￿ ￿
￿t
Y C
t
Kt
;
wt =
￿
￿t
Y C
t
LC
t
; where LC
t ￿ Ntlt:
Finally, note that labor market clearing and the pro￿ts equation are unchanged, and the resource
constraint becomes:
Ct + It + NE;tvt = wtLt + Ntdt + rK
t Kt:
The complete model can then be summarized by adding the equations in the following Table F1
to the equations in Table 2 that remain unchanged (markup, variety e⁄ect, free entry, number of
￿rms, intratemporal optimality, Euler equations for bonds and shares). An additional variable of
interest is then total investment, TIt ￿ It+vtNE;t, which aggregates investment in physical capital
for production of consumption goods and in new ￿rms.
36E.0.1 The Steady State
In steady state, the Euler equation for shares, combined with expressions for ￿rm value, pricing
and pro￿ts, yields:
￿
fE
Z
=
1 ￿ ￿
r + ￿
(￿(N) ￿ 1)
LC
N
:
From labor market clearing (or the aggregate accounting identity), combined with factor prices, the
free entry condition, pro￿t and pricing equations, and the steady-state number of entrants, labor
used to produce goods is:
LC = L ￿
fE
Z
￿
1 ￿ ￿
N:
Combining these two results, we have:
N =
(1 ￿ ￿)ZL
￿
￿ r+￿
￿(N)￿1 + ￿
￿
fE
:
This equation yields a value for N that depends on structural parameters.33 Under translog pref-
erences, precisely the same calibration scheme as that described in Appendix D for the baseline
model ensures that the steady-state markup and number of ￿rms NTrans are the same as under
C.E.S. preferences: ￿￿NCES = ￿ ￿ 1. Finally, from the rental rate expression, the steady-state
stock of capital can be determined once the steady-state number of ￿rms N is known:
K =
￿
Z
(1 ￿ ￿)
r + ￿K
￿(N)
￿(N)
￿ 1
￿ ￿
L ￿ N
fE
Z
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
:
All other variables can be easily determined once N and K are known.
The steady-state shares dN=Y C and vNE=Y C are the same as in the model without physical
capital. From the factor price expressions, the shares of physical capital and manufacturing labor
income into manufacturing output Y C are, respectively: rKK=Y C = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ and wLC=Y C
= ￿=￿: It follows that the share of total labor income into manufacturing output is:
wL
Y C =
1
￿
￿
￿ +
￿
r + ￿
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
:
33Note that when ￿ = 1, we obtain the same value of N as in the model without capital.
37The share of total investment is made up of two components: investment in new products/￿rms
vNE=YC and investment in new physical capital I=YC: The latter can be found from the expression
for the rental rate, using I=K = ￿K and rK = r +￿K; as: I=Y C = ￿K (1 ￿ ￿)=
￿
￿
￿
r + ￿K￿￿
: Note
that the share of investment in physical capital is smaller than its RBC counterpart ((1 ￿ ￿)￿K=
￿
r + ￿K￿
).
But the share of total investment in total GDP can be higher since it includes investment in
new ￿rms, namely (using that the share of manufacturing output into total output is YC=Y =
(1 + vNE=YC)
￿1):
TI
Y
=
￿
￿
r + ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
+
￿K
r + ￿K
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
1
1 + vNE=YC
:
In principle, it is possible to use this expression to calibrate the shares of labor ￿ and capital 1￿￿
as follows. TI=Y can be found from N.I.P.A. data, as usual in RBC exercises. Then we can use
micro data on ￿rm (job) destruction and markups to ￿nd the share of new goods￿investment in
GDP, and get 1 ￿ ￿ from the equation above (using also a standard value for physical capital
depreciation).
38References
[1] Aghion, P., and P. W. Howitt (1991): Endogenous Growth Theory, The MIT Press.
[2] Ambler, S., and E. Cardia (1998): ￿The Cyclical Behaviour of Wages and Pro￿ts under Im-
perfect Competition,￿Canadian Journal of Economics 31: 148-164.
[3] Axarloglou, K. (2003): ￿The Cyclicality of New Product Introductions,￿Journal of Business
76: 29-48.
[4] Basu, S., J. G. Fernald, and M. S. Kimball (2006): ￿Are Technology Improvements Contrac-
tionary?￿American Economic Review 96: 1418-1448.
[5] Benassy, J.-P. (1996): ￿Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Returns to Specialization and
Output Persistence,￿Economics Letters 52: 187-191.
[6] Bergin, P. R., and G. Corsetti (2008): ￿The Extensive Margin and Monetary Policy,￿Journal
of Monetary Economics 55: 1222-1237.
[7] Bernard, A. B., J. Eaton, J. B. Jensen, and S. Kortum (2003): ￿Plants and Productivity in
International Trade,￿American Economic Review 93: 1268-1290.
[8] Bernard, A. B., S. J. Redding, and P. K. Schott (2010): ￿Multi-Product Firms and Product
Switching,￿American Economic Review 100: 70-97.
[9] Bilbiie, F. O., I. Fujiwara, and F. Ghironi (2009): ￿Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous
Product Variety,￿mimeo, PSE, Bank of Japan, and Boston College.
[10] Bilbiie, F. O., F. Ghironi, and M. J. Melitz (2007): ￿Endogenous Entry, Product Variety and
Business Cycles,￿NBER WP 13646.
[11] Bilbiie, F. O., F. Ghironi, and M. J. Melitz (2008a): ￿Monopoly Power and Endogenous
Product Variety: Distortions and Remedies,￿NBER WP 14383.
[12] Bilbiie, F. O., F. Ghironi, and M. J. Melitz (2008b): ￿Monetary Policy and Business Cy-
cles with Endogenous Entry and Product Variety,￿ in Acemoglu, D., K. S. Rogo⁄, and M.
Woodford, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2007, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[13] Boldrin, M., L. J. Christiano, and J. Fisher (2001) ￿Habit Persistence, Asset Returns, and the
Business Cycle,￿American Economic Review, 91: 149-166
[14] Broda, C., and D. E. Weinstein (2010): ￿Product Creation and Destruction: Evidence and
Price Implications,￿American Economic Review 100: 691-723.
[15] Caballero, R. J., and M. L. Hammour (1994): ￿The Cleansing E⁄ect of Recessions,￿American
Economic Review 84: 1350-1368.
[16] Campbell, J. R. (1998): ￿Entry, Exit, Embodied Technology, and Business Cycles,￿Review of
Economic Dynamics 1: 371-408.
[17] Chatterjee, S., and R. Cooper (1993): ￿Entry and Exit, Product Variety and the Business
Cycle,￿NBER WP 4562.
39[18] Christiano, L. J. and T. J. Fitzgerald (1998): ￿The Business Cycle: It￿ s Still a Puzzle,￿Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 22: 56-83
[19] Chugh, S. K., and F. Ghironi (2009): ￿Optimal Fiscal Policy with Endogenous Product Vari-
ety,￿mimeo, University of Maryland and Boston College.
[20] Colciago, A. and F. Etro (2008): ￿Endogenous Market Structures and Business Cycles,￿
mimeo, University of Milan Bicocca.
[21] Comin, D., and M. Gertler (2006): ￿Medium Term Business Cycles,￿ American Economic
Review 96: 523-551.
[22] Cook, D., (2001): ￿Time to Enter and Business Cycles,￿Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 25 (8): 1241-1261.
[23] Cooley, T. F., and E. C. Prescott (1995): ￿Economic Growth and Business Cycles,￿in Cooley,
T.F., ed., Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, 1-38, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[24] Corsetti, G., P. Martin, and P. Pesenti (2007): ￿Productivity Spillovers, Terms of Trade, and
the ￿ Home Market E⁄ect￿ ,￿Journal of International Economics 73: 99-127.
[25] Davis, S., J. C. Haltiwanger, and S. Schuh (1996): Job Creation and Destruction, MIT Press,
Cambridge.
[26] Den Haan W. J. and P. Sedlacek (2010): ￿Ine¢ cient employment decisions, entry costs, and
the cost of ￿ uctuations,￿mimeo, University of Amsterdam
[27] Devereux, M. B., A. C. Head, and B. J. Lapham (1996a): ￿Aggregate Fluctuations with
Increasing Returns to Specialization and Scale,￿Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
20: 627-656.
[28] Devereux, M. B., A. C. Head, and B. J. Lapham (1996b): ￿Monopolistic Competition, In-
creasing Returns, and the E⁄ects of Government Spending,￿Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 28: 233-254.
[29] Dixit, A. K., and J. E. Stiglitz (1977): ￿Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity,￿American Economic Review 67: 297-308.
[30] Dos Santos Ferreira, R., and F. Dufourt (2006): ￿Free Entry and Business Cycles under the
In￿ uence of Animal Spirits,￿Journal of Monetary Economics 53: 311-328.
[31] Dunne, T., M. J. Roberts, and L. Samuelson (1988). ￿Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in US
Manufacturing Industries,￿RAND Journal of Economics 19: 495-515.
[32] Feenstra, R. C. (2003): ￿A Homothetic Utility Function for Monopolistic Competition Models,
without Constant Price Elasticity,￿Economics Letters 78: 79-86.
[33] Gal￿, J. (1995): ￿Product Diversity, Endogenous Markups, and Development Traps,￿Journal
of Monetary Economics 36: 39-64.
[34] Gal￿, J. (1999): ￿Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle: Do Technology Shocks
Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?￿American Economic Review 89: 249-271.
40[35] Ghironi, F., and M. J. Melitz (2005): ￿International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with
Heterogeneous Firms,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics CXX: 865-915.
[36] Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (1991): Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[37] Harrison, H., (2003): ￿Returns to Scale and Externalities in the Consumption and Investment
Sectors,￿Review of Economic Dynamics 6(4): 963-976.
[38] Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992): ￿Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium,￿Econo-
metrica 60: 1127-1150.
[39] Hopenhayn, H. A., and R. Rogerson (1993): ￿Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General
Equilibrium Analysis,￿Journal of Political Economy 101: 915-938.
[40] Jaimovich, N. and M. Floetotto (2008): ￿Firm Dynamics, Markup Variations, and the Business
Cycle,￿Journal of Monetary Economics 55: 1238-1252.
[41] Jovanovic, B. (2006): ￿Investment Options and the Business Cycle￿ , manuscript, New York
University.
[42] Judd, K. L. (1985): ￿On the Performance of Patents,￿Econometrica 53: 567-585.
[43] Kaldor, N. (1957): ￿A Model of Economic Growth,￿Economic Journal 67: 591-624.
[44] King, R. G., C. I. Plosser, and S. T. Rebelo (1988): ￿Production, Growth, and Business Cycles:
I. The Basic Neoclassical Model,￿Journal of Monetary Economics 21: 195-232.
[45] King, R. G., and S. T. Rebelo (1999): ￿Resuscitating Real Business Cycles,￿in Taylor, J. B.,
and M. Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1B, 927-1007, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[46] Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott (1982): ￿Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations,￿
Econometrica 50: 1345-1370.
[47] Lee, Y. and T. Mukoyama (2007). ￿Entry, Exit, and Plant-level Dynamics over the Business
Cycle,￿Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 07-18.
[48] Lewis, V. (2006): ￿Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Firm Entry: Theory and Evidence,￿
manuscript, Catholic University Leuven.
[49] Long, J. B., Jr. and C.I. Plosser (1983). ￿Real Business Cycles,￿Journal of Political Economy
91(1): 39-69
[50] Romer, P. (1990): ￿Endogenous Technological Change,￿ Journal of Political Economy 98:
71-102.
[51] Rotemberg, J. J., and M. Woodford (1992): ￿Oligopolistic Pricing and the E⁄ects of Aggregate
Demand on Economic Activity,￿Journal of Political Economy 100: 1153-1207.
[52] Rotemberg, J. J., and M. Woodford (1999): ￿The Cyclical Behavior of Prices and Costs,￿
in Taylor, J. B., and M. Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1B, 1051-1135,
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[53] Samaniego, R. M. (2008): ￿Entry, Exit and Business Cycles in a General Equilibrium Model,￿
Review of Economic Dynamics 11: 529-541.
41[54] Schumpeter, J. A. (1934): The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press.
[55] Shao, E., and P. Silos (2008): ￿Firm Entry and Labor Market Dynamics,￿mimeo, San Fran-
cisco State University and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
[56] Shleifer, A. (1986): ￿Implementation Cycles,￿Journal of Political Economy. 94(6): 1163-90.
[57] Sim, J. W. (2007): ￿Uncertainty, Firm Dynamics and Business Cycles,￿ mimeo, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
[58] Uhlig, H. (1999): ￿A Toolkit for Analyzing Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic Models Easily,￿in
Marimon, R., and A. Scott, eds., Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic Economies,
30-61, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[59] Wang, P., and Y. Wen (2007): ￿A Defense of RBC: Understanding the Puzzling E⁄ects of
Technology Shocks,￿mimeo, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
[60] Woodford, M. (2003): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy,
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
42TABLE 1. Two frameworks
C.E.S. Translog
￿(Nt) = ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 ￿(Nt) = ￿t = 1 + 1
￿Nt
￿(Nt) = N
￿￿1
t
￿
= N
1
￿￿1
t
￿
￿(Nt) = e
￿ 1
2
~ N￿Nt
￿ ~ NNt ; ~ N ￿ Mass(￿)
￿(Nt) = ￿ ￿ 1 ￿(Nt) = 1
2￿Nt = 1
2 (￿(Nt) ￿ 1)
43TABLE 2. Model Summary
Pricing ￿t = ￿t
wt
Zt
Markup ￿t = ￿(Nt)
Variety e⁄ect ￿t = ￿(Nt)
Pro￿ts dt =
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿t
￿
Ct
Nt
Free entry vt = wt
fE
Zt
Number of ￿rms Nt = (1 ￿ ￿)(Nt￿1 + NE;t￿1)
Intratemporal optimality ￿(Lt)
1
’ = wt
Ct
Euler equation (shares) vt = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et
h
Ct
Ct+1 (vt+1 + dt+1)
i
Aggregate accounting Ct + NE;tvt = wtLt + Ntdt
44TABLE 3. Moments for: Data, C.E.S. Model, and Baseline RBCa
Variable X ￿X ￿X=￿Y R 1st autocorr. corr(X;YR)
YR 1.81 1.63 1.39 1.00 0.84 0.69 0.72 1.00
CR 1.35 0.71 0.61 0.74 0.44 0.44 0.80 0.75 0.79 0.88 0.95 0.94
Investment, vRNE 5.30 6.82 4.09 2.93 4.18 2.95 0.87 0.67 0.71 0.80 0.99 0.99
L 1.79 1.01 0.67 0.99 0.62 0.48 0.88 0.67 0.71 0.88 0.98 0.97
aSource for data and RBC moments: King and Rebelo (1999)
45TABLE 4. Moments for: Data, C.E.S. Model with Capital, and Baseline RBCa
Variable X ￿X ￿X=￿Y R 1st autocorr. corr(X;YR)
YR 1.81 1.75 1.39 1.00 0.84 0.70 0.72 1.00
CR 1.35 0.62 0.61 0.74 0.35 0.44 0.80 0.63 0.79 0.88 0.98 0.94
Investment, TIR 5.30 4.39 4.09 2.93 2.51 2.95 0.87 0.72 0.71 0.80 1.00 0.99
L 1.79 1.62 0.67 0.99 0.93 0.48 0.88 0.71 0.71 0.88 0.99 0.97
aSource for data and RBC moments: King and Rebelo (1999)
46TABLE F1. Model with Physical Capital, Summary
Pricing ￿t = ￿(Nt)￿t
Pro￿ts dt =
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿(Nt)
￿
Y C
t
Nt
Capital accumulation Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿K)Kt + It
Euler equation (capital) 1 = ￿Et
￿￿
Ct+1
Ct
￿￿1 ￿
rK
t+1 + 1 ￿ ￿K￿￿
Aggregate accounting Y C
t + vtNE;t = wtLt + Ntdt + rK
t Kt
Total manufacturing output Y C
t = Ct + It
Real wage wt = ￿
￿t
Y C
t
LC
t
Rental rate rK
t =
(1￿￿)
￿t
Y C
t
Kt
Labor in manufacturing Y C
t = ￿tZt
￿
LC
t
￿￿ K1￿￿
t
Labor in entry LE
t = NE;tfE=Zt
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49Figure 3: Model-Based Correlations: GDP, Real Pro￿ts, and Entry
50Figure 4: The Cyclicality of the Markup￿
￿ Source for Data: Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), page 1066, Table 2, column 2.
51H(N) 
N  0 
HCES 
NCES=Ntrans 
H(N(σ*)) 
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